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stubby

Airlines have an off button

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stubby

Lets face it we need a human element after the last 2 boeing crashes we need to wake up all those years of pilot training should mean something and after all a pilot can see the ground grow closer!!

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fostraswift

example of technology getting too smart...

 

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LeoTex
3 hours ago, fostraswift said:

example of technology getting too smart...

 

Looks like it was proven that the pilots didn't know about the sensor that cause the crash.

I think it was on the new yesterday where the comment was made that Boeing didn't know about them.

LeoTex

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Whalley
Posted (edited)
6 hours ago, stubby said:

Lets face it we need a human element after the last 2 boeing crashes we need to wake up all those years of pilot training should mean something and after all a pilot can see the ground grow closer!!

The magic buttons were there but the pilots simply failed to use them.

Sensor failure on the Max caused a stabilizer runaway.  

Pilots are trained for this event.  It's not a check list item, but a memory item and practiced routinely in the flight simulator.

The magic button you speak of, is right there on the control wheel (Manual Electric Trim) on the Max for the pilot to use in such an event.

As the aircraft headed nose down, all the pilot had to do was use his left thumb and trim nose up and back to level flight.  This switch cuts out the automatic system and let's the pilot control the stabilizer nose-up or nose-down.

The other magic switch is right beside the pilot. Actually two of them. Stab cutout switches. Flick either one of them to cutoff position and the automatic system is dead.

In the cutout position, the pilot can still trim the stabilizer with a hand wheel right beside their knee.

In both crashes, the pilots failed to follow standard operational procedures for a runaway stabilizer.

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Edited by Whalley

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Whalley
Posted (edited)
2 hours ago, LeoTex said:

Looks like it was proven that the pilots didn't know about the sensor that cause the crash.

I think it was on the new yesterday where the comment was made that Boeing didn't know about them.

LeoTex

 

Up until the Lion Air crash, little was conveyed to the pilots about the new system.

There was an extreme heightened awareness at the time of the Ethiopian Air crash with implicit instructions , EAD (Emergency Airworthiness Directive) issued Nov, 2018.

The Ethiopian pilots did not follow the Stab runaway procedures in the EAD.

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Edited by Whalley

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Skyline69

Great posts Whalley - thx!

I’m a private pilot and have watched pretty much all of the Air Disasters episodes.  It seems like many commercial crashes could be prevented if the pilots fell back on their basic piloting skills.

Easy to say, I know, when you don’t have a a screwy attitude and a dozen alarms blaring at you...

Do you know if commercial pilots are required to do (simulated or otherwise) flights without relying on autopilot?  Why do you think they seem to lose their instincts?

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Whalley
Posted (edited)
4 hours ago, Skyline69 said:

Great posts Whalley - thx!

I’m a private pilot and have watched pretty much all of the Air Disasters episodes.  It seems like many commercial crashes could be prevented if the pilots fell back on their basic piloting skills.

Easy to say, I know, when you don’t have a a screwy attitude and a dozen alarms blaring at you...

Do you know if commercial pilots are required to do (simulated or otherwise) flights without relying on autopilot?  Why do you think they seem to lose their instincts?

 

Failure to fall back on basic pilot skills are too often the cause of disaster as was the case with Air France 447, Airbus A330 crash.  Aircraft systems failed but the pilots did not respond according to their training or basic pilot skills.

Same with regards the first B737 Max crash.  Lion Air pilots and Maintenance were heavily criticized for lack of safety culture and failing to follow SOP (standard operating procedure).

Commerical Pilots are periodically required to manually fly the aircraft, but I don't know the regulations.

 

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.

 

 

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Edited by Whalley

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likeaking
Posted (edited)

A bit off topic, but last month on a flight to Taipei, the plane was approaching the runway, landing gear down, and was being buffeted by winds that rocked the plane's wing tips up and down. I had a widow seat and was aware of this. Everyone else was being super cool and never stopped watching their movies or relaxing. Suddenly the pilot gunned the engines, harder even than when taking off, and the plane nosed upward and finally banked around. The pilot then came on the intercom and said we were going around because of weather. It was the only time I was ever acutely aware of my mortality on a plane. 

As we deplaned, the attendants were saying their "bye, bye" and I said to one, "The pilot did a good job.". She said, "Why don't you tell him, he's right there." gesturing to her right. There he was, in his shirt sleeves, legs and arms crossed, leaning against the cockpit doorway, watching the passengers leaving. As I passed him, I patted him on the shoulder and said, "Good job.".  Odd thing was, I don't think many, if any, other passengers were aware of the aborted landing as it happened. 

Edited by likeaking

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Atlas

Hello,

No expert.... But I watched 60Mins I think it was.. The pilots did override it several times, it would last 5 seconds before nose diving for 10 secs, repeat until there was no altitude left...

And this was a SINGLE point of failure, unheard of in planes of the modern era... Boeing in their pursuit of $$$ have a lot to answer for. 

 

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Harry Brown

 

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Harry Brown

In a repetitive cycle, It looks like the MCAPS would come on for 10  seconds decending then break off for 5 seconds, allowing the pilots to climb, a losing battle. 

 

 

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Whalley
1 hour ago, Atlas said:

Hello,

No expert.... But I watched 60Mins I think it was.. The pilots did override it several times, it would last 5 seconds before nose diving for 10 secs, repeat until there was no altitude left...

And this was a SINGLE point of failure, unheard of in planes of the modern era... Boeing in their pursuit of $$$ have a lot to answer for. 

 

 

1 hour ago, Harry Brown said:

In a repetitive cycle, It looks like the MCAPS would come on for 10  seconds decending then break off for 5 seconds, allowing the pilots to climb, a losing battle. 

 

 

 

Makes for good TV but no accuracy in that report.

The new MCAS system did cause a Stabilizer Runaway because of a sensor failure.

What's missing in the report is that pilots are required to be trained to deal with a runaway stabilizer, no matter what the cause.  And are trained to deal with a Stabilizer Runaway as a memory item and not by referring to their quick reference handbook as depicted in the video.

Within a second the pilot can override a runaway stabilizer using the thumb switches on their control wheels and regain control of the aircraft.

Then use the cutout switches (as shown in my previous post) to render inop any electrical movement of the Stabilizer 

Boeing issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive in Nov 2018 (prior to the Ethiopian Air crash) precisely describing this corrective procedure.

The Pilots in both crashes failed to follow these simple procedures.

Left thumb select nose up!  Then cutout switch to cutout position!

That's it That's All!

The day before the Lion Air crash, the Lion Air pilots experienced the same failure on the same aircraft but followed this very simple procedure without incident.

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Whalley
Posted (edited)

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Edited by Whalley

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Atlas

The fact that it is and can be a single point of failure should be fixed. This is not a military aircraft. 

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Whalley
2 hours ago, Atlas said:

The fact that it is and can be a single point of failure should be fixed. This is not a military aircraft. 

 

For sure an easy fix.

Single sensor or single point failures are far more common than you might think on modern aircraft.

Boeing's justification for the single sensor was based on how simple an MCAS Stabilizer Runaway can be overridden by the pilots.  And the fact that Stabilizer Runaway emergency procedure is mandated as a memory item.

How the pilots failed to quickly disable the Stab Runaway still boggles my mind.

I look at the Ethiopian crash, flight data recorder download and can only shake my head at the number of errors on the part of the flight crew.  It's huge!

It's as if the pilots had not seen the Emergency Airworthiness Directive issued by Boeing months earlier and had never been trained on the runaway procedure.

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Atlas
6 hours ago, Whalley said:

 

For sure an easy fix.

Single sensor or single point failures are far more common than you might think on modern aircraft.

Boeing's justification for the single sensor was based on how simple an MCAS Stabilizer Runaway can be overridden by the pilots.  And the fact that Stabilizer Runaway emergency procedure is mandated as a memory item.

How the pilots failed to quickly disable the Stab Runaway still boggles my mind.

I look at the Ethiopian crash, flight data recorder download and can only shake my head at the number of errors on the part of the flight crew.  It's huge!

It's as if the pilots had not seen the Emergency Airworthiness Directive issued by Boeing months earlier and had never been trained on the runaway procedure.

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Mate,

I don't know enough about this stuff... But I know if I was scheduled to fly in a max 8 I would think twice about it.... I do hope Boeing has fixed it and the pilots learn how to correct it, but heads should roll if it happens again. 

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Whalley
17 hours ago, Atlas said:

Mate,

I don't know enough about this stuff... But I know if I was scheduled to fly in a max 8 I would think twice about it.... I do hope Boeing has fixed it and the pilots learn how to correct it, but heads should roll if it happens again. 

 

In the most simplest of terms it indicates that Ethiopian Air failed to relay to their pilots the critical information in the Nov 2018 EAD that I posted above.

The nine bullet points in the EAD detailing the symptoms and conditions leading to MCAS stab runaway. (almost every bullet condition existed yet the Ethiopian pilots seemed oblivious to what was happening)

The need to use the trim thumb switches to counter the stab runaway returning the stabilizer to normal prior to selecting the cutout switches to cutoff position.  Clear and concise but they did not do this.

The operating instructions in the EAD are so clear and simple, but the Ethiopian pilots failed to follow them.

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Atlas
On 22/05/2019 at 13:20, Whalley said:

 

In the most simplest of terms it indicates that Ethiopian Air failed to relay to their pilots the critical information in the Nov 2018 EAD that I posted above.

The nine bullet points in the EAD detailing the symptoms and conditions leading to MCAS stab runaway. (almost every bullet condition existed yet the Ethiopian pilots seemed oblivious to what was happening)

The need to use the trim thumb switches to counter the stab runaway returning the stabilizer to normal prior to selecting the cutout switches to cutoff position.  Clear and concise but they did not do this.

The operating instructions in the EAD are so clear and simple, but the Ethiopian pilots failed to follow them.

Again mate as I understood the 60 mins report, they tried in vain, it would work ok for 5 secs and go back into a dive for 10 secs.... They ran out of altitude.... Either way you can bet those poor buggers on board had a horrific time before it all came to an end. RIP

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Whalley
1 hour ago, Atlas said:

Again mate as I understood the 60 mins report, they tried in vain, it would work ok for 5 secs and go back into a dive for 10 secs.... They ran out of altitude.... Either way you can bet those poor buggers on board had a horrific time before it all came to an end. RIP

 

The download from the Flight Data Recorder says otherwise.  The pilots did everything wrong according to their training and most importantly wrong according to the very recent Emergency Airworthiness Directive.

Firstly the nine bullet points in the AD tell the pilot how to identify quickly, a failed AOA sensor.

After takeoff the AOA sensor failed and most of the conditions described in the bullet points existed per the FDR download (stick shaker one side only, airspeed and altitude disagree autopilot cutout etc.)

But most fortunate for them was the fact that the flaps are still down so no MCAS stab runaway.  MCAS Operates only with 2 conditions, manual flying and flaps up. Auto pilot disengaged so now manually flying.  Proper course of action would be leave the flaps down, return and land.

But what do they do?  Raise the fucking flaps!

MCAS kicks in and trims nose down.

No worries if they were trained or simply read the AD.  Just use your left thumb and trim the stab back and then immediately use the cutoff switches. And leave them in the cutout position.

The red and magenta lines show the pilots never corrected using their thumb switches  and not until the seventh runaway before using the cutout switches.

They had countered  the runaway with elevators by pulling the column back.  They left the thrust levers at takeoff position per the FDR graph, exceeded max operating speed  of the aircraft VMO (top of the FDR graph) making it impossible to hold the control columns against the ever increasing feel forces.  Also in an over speed, the manual stab trim wheels would be near impossible to operate.

Their fatal error was returning the Stab Cutout switches back to normal (red line near the end and only briefly using the thumb trim switches to correct.  They could have save their asses had they held the thumb switches as the stab trim did respond correctly but they released the thumb switch.

MCAS kicked in the eighth time and again stab runaway and it was all over.

Per standard emergency runaway procedures and the AD, must leave the switches in the cutout position

 

Edited by Whalley

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Atlas
On 23/05/2019 at 22:42, Whalley said:

 

The download from the Flight Data Recorder says otherwise.  The pilots did everything wrong according to their training and most importantly wrong according to the very recent Emergency Airworthiness Directive.

Firstly the nine bullet points in the AD tell the pilot how to identify quickly, a failed AOA sensor.

After takeoff the AOA sensor failed and most of the conditions described in the bullet points existed per the FDR download (stick shaker one side only, airspeed and altitude disagree autopilot cutout etc.)

But most fortunate for them was the fact that the flaps are still down so no MCAS stab runaway.  MCAS Operates only with 2 conditions, manual flying and flaps up. Auto pilot disengaged so now manually flying.  Proper course of action would be leave the flaps down, return and land.

But what do they do?  Raise the fucking flaps!

MCAS kicks in and trims nose down.

No worries if they were trained or simply read the AD.  Just use your left thumb and trim the stab back and then immediately use the cutoff switches. And leave them in the cutout position.

The red and magenta lines show the pilots never corrected using their thumb switches  and not until the seventh runaway before using the cutout switches.

They had countered  the runaway with elevators by pulling the column back.  They left the thrust levers at takeoff position per the FDR graph, exceeded max operating speed  of the aircraft VMO (top of the FDR graph) making it impossible to hold the control columns against the ever increasing feel forces.  Also in an over speed, the manual stab trim wheels would be near impossible to operate.

Their fatal error was returning the Stab Cutout switches back to normal (red line near the end and only briefly using the thumb trim switches to correct.  They could have save their asses had they held the thumb switches as the stab trim did respond correctly but they released the thumb switch.

MCAS kicked in the eighth time and again stab runaway and it was all over.

Per standard emergency runaway procedures and the AD, must leave the switches in the cutout position

 

Hey mate,

Very interesting. You certainly have a good grasp on this, what is your background, are you a pilot ? 

If it is pilot error then so be it, we are all human and make mistakes, though usually for most of us, they cost our lives or the lives of others... 

Surely there is more than 1 AOA on this aircraft ? 

 

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Whalley
1 hour ago, Atlas said:

Hey mate,

Very interesting. You certainly have a good grasp on this, what is your background, are you a pilot ? 

If it is pilot error then so be it, we are all human and make mistakes, though usually for most of us, they cost our lives or the lives of others... 

Surely there is more than 1 AOA on this aircraft ? 

 

My background is aeronautical engineering.  I have more than 40 years on type with regards to the B737.  For a period of almost 10 years, I taught A320 and B737 systems training to pilots in the classroom and in the simulator.

The Max has 2 AOA sensors and two flight control computers (FCC).  The left AOA sensor feeds data to FCC1 and the right AOA sensor to FCC2.  FCC in command switches every flight and the other serves as backup and takes control automatically in the event of failure of the FCC in command.

 

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Atlas
12 hours ago, Whalley said:

My background is aeronautical engineering.  I have more than 40 years on type with regards to the B737.  For a period of almost 10 years, I taught A320 and B737 systems training to pilots in the classroom and in the simulator.

The Max has 2 AOA sensors and two flight control computers (FCC).  The left AOA sensor feeds data to FCC1 and the right AOA sensor to FCC2.  FCC in command switches every flight and the other serves as backup and takes control automatically in the event of failure of the FCC in command.

 

Well there you go ! 

So if / when the Max is allowed to fly again, would you fly on it ? 

Can't say I would until they had a couple of years incident free under their belt. I read last night they have some 5000 orders pending on this, lets hope $$ do not muddy the re-certification process. 

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Whalley
1 minute ago, Atlas said:

Well there you go ! 

So if / when the Max is allowed to fly again, would you fly on it ? 

Can't say I would until they had a couple of years incident free under their belt. I read last night they have some 5000 orders pending on this, lets hope $$ do not muddy the re-certification process. 

 

In Canada, even prior to the modifications currently underway, I would have had no reservations about flying in a Max.

I know the training standards here and I don't believe for a minute that given the same circumstances that a crash would have ever occurred.

I talk with 737 pilots on a daily basis and they are as dismayed as I am with what occurred with Lion Air and Ethiopian Air pilots.  

There are literally  hundreds of potential emergencies a pilot may have to deal with. But, as I posted before, stabilizer runaway are one of a dozen procedures pilots must commit to memory and pilots are drilled routinely on competency in a simulator.

Would I fly on a Max (or any aircraft) with an Indonesian or African airline?  That's a whole other matter.

 

 

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Skyline69

Further supporting the “which airline matters” argument, it’s interesting to note the parallels with Quantas flight 72 on 07 OCT 2008:

While cruising from Perth to Singapore, the control computers on an Airbus 330 violently forced the nose down several times as a result of incorrect Angle-of-Attack processing.  

The plane was safely landed thanks to a sharp crew who drew on their prior military experience.

A subsequent flight, Quantas 71 on 27 DEC 2008, encountered a similar error but the pilots correctly followed a revised flight procedure and no injuries resulted.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-070.aspx

It looks like the precise cause of the AoA errors was never discovered.  Improved flight control logic, AoA processing, and crew training avoids the problem on today’s A330/A340 aircraft.

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Whalley
5 hours ago, Skyline69 said:

Further supporting the “which airline matters” argument, it’s interesting to note the parallels with Quantas flight 72 on 07 OCT 2008:

While cruising from Perth to Singapore, the control computers on an Airbus 330 violently forced the nose down several times as a result of incorrect Angle-of-Attack processing.  

The plane was safely landed thanks to a sharp crew who drew on their prior military experience.

A subsequent flight, Quantas 71 on 27 DEC 2008, encountered a similar error but the pilots correctly followed a revised flight procedure and no injuries resulted.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-070.aspx

It looks like the precise cause of the AoA errors was never discovered.  Improved flight control logic, AoA processing, and crew training avoids the problem on today’s A330/A340 aircraft.

Qantas flight 32, A380 is another example of an amazing end to a catastrophic uncontained  engine failure.  Anaircraft disabled beyond belief but they pulled it off.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_32

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